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Abstract
This analysis of the Copenhagen Accord evaluates emission reduction pledges by individual
countries against the Accord’s climate-related objectives. Probabilistic estimates of the climatic
consequences for a set of resulting multi-gas scenarios over the 21st century are calculated with
a reduced complexity climate model, yielding global temperature increase and atmospheric
CO2 and CO2-equivalent concentrations. Provisions for banked surplus emission allowances
and credits from land use, land-use change and forestry are assessed and are shown to have the
potential to lead to significant deterioration of the ambition levels implied by the pledges in
2020. This analysis demonstrates that the Copenhagen Accord and the pledges made under it
represent a set of dissonant ambitions. The ambition level of the current pledges for 2020 and
the lack of commonly agreed goals for 2050 place in peril the Accord’s own ambition: to limit
global warming to below 2 ◦C, and even more so for 1.5 ◦C, which is referenced in the Accord
in association with potentially strengthening the long-term temperature goal in 2015. Due to the
limited level of ambition by 2020, the ability to limit emissions afterwards to pathways
consistent with either the 2 or 1.5 ◦C goal is likely to become less feasible.
Keywords: climate change, greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, climate negotiations,
Copenhagen Accord
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1. Introduction
In Copenhagen, December 2009, representatives of 193
governments gathered at the 15th session of the Conference
of the Parties (COP15) of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, henceforth also
called ‘the Convention’) and the 5th session of the Conference
of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol (CMP5); about 120 of them were represented
by Heads of State. Work initiated in Bali in 2007, with the
aim to urgently enhance the implementation of the Convention
in order to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system (UNFCCC 2007), was to be completed at
COP15. In the end, the conference resulted in the ‘Copenhagen
Accord’ (henceforth called ‘the Accord’) (UNFCCC 2009d),
which was negotiated as part of a closed negotiating segment
by 26 nations. Not reflecting the ambitions of, or involving,
many of the Parties, it was only ‘taken note of’ by the
Conference of the Parties. The total number of Parties that
have expressed their intention to be associated with the Accord
is 138 (information as of 19 August 2010). Additionally,
decisions were made to continue negotiations under both the
Convention (UNFCCC 2009c) and the Kyoto Protocol (KP,
henceforth also called ‘the Protocol’) (UNFCCC 2009b) tracks
until the end of 2010. The UNFCCC Secretariat clarified that
the provisions of the Accord do not have any legal standing
within the UNFCCC process (UNFCCC 2010f). Although its
significance as a political agreement is disputed among Parties,
it cannot be neglected as it is framing the ongoing negotiations
towards a global agreement.
In the Accord, Parties ‘[· · ·] agree that deep cuts in global
emissions are required according to science, [· · ·] with a view
to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global
temperature below 2 ◦C’ and hereby preventing ‘dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’. 1.5 ◦C
is referenced in the Accord in association with potentially
strengthening the long-term temperature goal based on ‘various
matters presented by the science’ in 2015. Tables for individual
country mitigation pledges were left empty in the Accord. By
the end of August 2010, 85 countries from both developed and
developing countries had submitted pledges. The final version
of the Accord does not include long-term reduction goals, such
as a global reduction target for 2050. Global targets of −50%
from 1990 levels by 2050 and an aggregate developed country
target of at least −80% by 2050 were present in informal drafts
that circulated until a few hours before the conclusion of the
negotiations, and are also part of current negotiation texts in
preparation for COP16 (as of August 2010) (UNFCCC 2010b).
Here, we analyse the Accord with the pledges as they were
communicated to the UNFCCC by mid-April 2010 (UNFCCC
2010d, 2010e). The focus of our analysis is the extent
to which these pledges bridge the gap from current policy
to what is needed to achieve the Accord’s climate-related
objectives. Many groups have already carried out analyses to
assess the emission levels resulting from the Accord (Climate
Analytics and Ecofys 2010, Climate Interactive 2010, den
Elzen et al 2010a, European Commission 2010, Levin and
Bradley 2010, Macintosh 2010, Stern 2009, UNEP 2010),
but the analysis presented here is one of the few—besides
the analysis of Climate Analytics and Ecofys (2010) and den
Elzen et al (2010a)—that considers specific provisions, such
as the banking of surplus emission allowances, and debits
and credits resulting from land use, land-use change and
forestry (LULUCF) accounting, that can deteriorate the level
of ambition for emission reductions in 2020. Additionally,
we perform individual probabilistic multi-gas climate runs for
each emission pathway, not present in other analyses in the
literature. This analysis builds on and provides an extension of
our earlier work (Rogelj et al 2010).
2. Methods
The global climatic consequences of the Accord are assessed
against a set of scenarios. Two options for 2020 (case
1 and case 2) are constructed based on the range of
pledges and actions submitted to the Accord. To calculate
emission levels in 2020, a bottom-up approach is applied
with the emission module of the Potsdam Integrated Model
for Probabilistic Assessment of Emission Paths (PRIMAP)
(Nabel et al 2010b). Emissions are reduced (see tables S1
and S3 in the supplementary data available at stacks.iop.org/
ERL/5/034013/mmedia for an overview of the considered
mitigation actions) from a composite reference pathway which
incorporates policy in place9 before COP15/CMP5. When
no targets or actions are available for a country, the pre-
defined reference pathway is assumed. Emissions are extended
beyond 2020 assuming either further growth or a 2050 global
reduction target. For calculations of the climatic consequences,
a probabilistic approach with the reduced complexity climate
model MAGICC (Meinshausen et al 2008) is used, with
model parameters closely representing estimates of the Fourth
Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) (IPCC 2007b).
2.1. Reference pathway
A reference pathway which accurately represents past emission
levels as reported by Parties is paramount to calculate target
levels that are defined as a percentage below a particular base
year level. Analogously, target levels which are defined as a
deviation from a certain baseline require country projections.
Therefore, a comprehensive composite reference scenario
(further referred to as the PRIMAP4 scenario) was constructed
for all parties. Targets are often defined on the so-called Kyoto
greenhouse gas (GHG) basket and not on single GHGs. The
Kyoto-GHG basket includes carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). To
construct the CO2-equivalent (CO2eq) Kyoto-GHG basket, the
global warming potentials (GWP) that are used under the
Protocol for reporting purposes (UNFCCC 1997b) as well as
under the Convention (UNFCCC 2002) are used. These GWPs
9 In accordance with the assumptions made in the International Energy
Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Outlook (IEA 2009). For example the 20%
pledge of the European Union (EU) was already in place before COP15/CMP5
as part of the European Climate and Energy Package and is therefore included
in the reference pathway.
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are those specified in the Second Assessment Report of the
IPCC (IPCC 1996).
This PRIMAP4 reference scenario with annual country
resolution is constructed as a composite pathway. A detailed
description of the methodology can be found in Nabel
et al (2010b). The PRIMAP4 scenario is based on the
following emission data sources in descending order of
prioritization: (1) National Inventory Submissions to the
UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2009a) as submitted by Parties. Only
Annex I countries10 have the obligation to provide these
annual submissions. For Non-Annex I countries, data from
(2) National Communications to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC
2009e) are considered. These two reported historical data
sources are complemented with (3) historical data from the
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC) for
CO2 from fossil fuel and cement (Boden et al 2009) and
(4) historical data from the Emission Database for Global
Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) for CH4 and N2O (JRC
and PBL 2009). For future projections, emissions from
(5) the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy
Outlook (IEA 2009), (6) the Prospective Outlook on Long-
term Energy Systems (POLES) model (ENERDATA 2009)
and (7) the downscaled composite scenario based on the
SRESA1B pathway developed in the framework of the ad hoc
group for the Modelling and Assessment of Contributions
of Climate Change (MATCH) are used (Ho¨hne et al 2010).
To complement the MATCH pathways for fluorinated gases
(HFCs, PFCs and SF6), (8) the downscaled SRESA1B pathway
of the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency was
used (van Vuuren et al 2006).
For international shipping, historical data provided by
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (Buhaug et al
2009) is combined with IMO’s best estimate of the SRESA1B
scenario. For international aviation, historical emission and
projection data (Owen et al 2010) is completed with future
trend data from the OMEGA project (Meinshausen and Raper
2009).
The data underlying the calculations on LULUCF
accounting are based on the KP LULUCF activities calculated
by using proxies developed from the LULUCF sectoral data
reported in national inventories to the UNFCCC. A detailed
description of the LULUCF activity reference data is provided
online (Nabel et al 2010a).
2.2. Emissions assessment
The PRIMAP4 scenario described above is the starting point
for a bottom-up assessment of the emission implications of the
Accord. Many Parties provided a range of emission targets
with the more ambitious end being conditional, for example,
upon a global comprehensive agreement or access to financing.
The two ends of the ambition range lead to our cases for 2020:
‘case 1’ applies the low ambition and ‘case 2’ the high ambition
options. Our assessment is based on the international pledges
of Parties in the framework of the Accord only, although
10 So-called Annex I countries are listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC
(UNFCCC 1992), see the supplementary data (available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/
5/034013/mmedia).
in some cases (e.g. China) some interpretations of national
climate plans could be more ambitious than the international
pledge of a Party.
2.2.1. Developed countries. The emission levels in 2020 for
developed countries are calculated by applying the emission
reduction percentages of their pledges to their respective base
year emissions. On top of these reduction pledges, various
provisions from the Protocol are considered. Developed
countries, for which land-use change and forestry was a net
source in 1990, fall under the provisions of article 3.7 of
the Protocol (UNFCCC 1997a). This paragraph states that
countries shall add their emissions from land-use change to
their base year emissions from which the allowed emissions in
the respective commitment period are calculated. Specifically,
this provision is assumed for the 2000 reference year for
Australia’s 2020 pledge under the Accord. Once emission
levels based on the pledges are calculated, credits from
LULUCF accounting and surplus allowances are added.
LULUCF accounting in developed countries can generate
emission credits or debits which influence the final allowances
of countries for their industrial, fossil and agricultural
emissions. The Accord did not address this issue. The rules
for the first KP commitment period (CP1) are described in
the Protocol and the Marrakesh Accords (UNFCCC 2001).
Under article 3.3 of the Protocol, individual countries must
account for GHG fluxes from afforestation, reforestation,
and deforestation, and under article 3.4 they can choose
additional activities to account for. Those additional activities
are forest management, cropland management, grazing-land
management and revegetation. Debits or credits from forest
management activities are subject to a country-specific cap,
listed in the appendix to the Annex of Decision 16/CMP.1
(UNFCCC 2005). Setting the size of the cap for each country
was informed by 3% of the base year emissions and 15%
of the forest management sector. Continuation of the same
rules but with forest management accounting made mandatory
would likely result in net credits of 0.3 gigatonnes CO2eq
(GtCO2eq) per year from 2013 to 2020. For illustration, we
assume that the cap on forest management is increased to 4%
of 1990 emissions as a proxy for the lower ambition options
currently discussed, for example introducing exception clauses
for not having to account for so-called natural disturbances
(UNFCCC 2010a). Our LULUCF accounting assumption
leads to yearly allowances of 0.5 GtCO2eq for the group
of developed countries which specified to use LULUCF
accounting to achieve their target in communications prior to
the Accord (UNFCCC 2010a). As no post-2012 LULUCF
accounting rules have been agreed, there is clearly some
uncertainty in regard to the final net effect. These LULUCF
allowances are included in case 1, while in case 2 we assume
LULUCF accounting to result in a net zero effect. For case
1, target emissions of a country pledge ‘including LULUCF’
will be increased by credits from LULUCF accounting and
vice versa for debits.
Furthermore, if a developed country reaches emission
levels which are below its initially attributed assigned amount
units (AAUs) in CP1, the difference between the real emission
3
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Figure 1. Illustration of estimation of surplus assigned amount units
(AAUs) for Ukraine (UKR), the Russian Federation (RUS) and the
European Union (EU27). Reported data to the UNFCCC is plotted as
thin solid lines up to 2007. The dashed line shows the projections of
the PRIMAP4 reference scenario and case 1 targets without
provisions for 2020. The thick solid line segments between 2008 and
2012 show the emission allowances under the Kyoto Protocol for
each respective country. The coloured area under the thick line
segments hence represents the estimated surplus emissions
allowances for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol for
each country.
and their allowances can be banked as surplus AAUs to be
used in subsequent commitment periods under the provisions
specified in article 3.13 of the Protocol. Because of weak CP1
targets and due to the economic slowdown after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the emissions of some countries with
economies in transition are well below their AAUs. This
is particularly the case for Russia (5.6 GtCO2eq), Ukraine
(2.5 GtCO2eq) and other countries in Eastern Europe which are
now part of the European Union (2.8 GtCO2eq) (see figure 1).
The Accord does not address these estimated 11 GtCO2eq of
surplus AAUs. Credits from LULUCF accounting (RMUs)
cannot be banked (UNFCCC 2001). RMUs, however, can
be used domestically or traded in CP1 by countries already
having surplus AAUs and therefore still result in 1.0 GtCO2eq
of additional surplus allowances. This yields a total of
12 GtCO2eq surplus AAUs banked from CP1 to subsequent
commitment periods. Depending on the quantitative emission
reduction or limitation commitments (UNFCCC 2010c) Parties
negotiate for after 2012, additional surplus AAUs are estimated
in the range of 2–12 GtCO2eq. In our case 1, the banked
AAUs from CP1 are added on top of the pledged pathways
as a linearly increasing wedge, shown in figure 2(a), while
surplus generated after 2012 is used after 2020. Case 2 assumes
that Parties agree to not purchase banked AAUs from CP1 but
at the same time allows for the generation and use of about
2 GtCO2eq of new surplus AAUs after 2012.
2.2.2. Developing countries. In contrast to the relatively
precise pledges of developed countries, developing countries
specify their mitigation actions, labelled as Nationally
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), in a plethora of
ways. A common method to specify developing countries’
actions is in terms of reductions from an implied, but often
unspecified, future ‘business-as-usual’ scenario. Also, some
proposed actions are framed in terms of emission intensity
improvements, i.e. a decrease of emissions per gross domestic
product (GDP). For example, China proposed a decrease
of 40–45% in their CO2 emission intensity from 2005 to
2020. This could amount to slightly higher or lower intensity
improvements than projected in the reference scenario,
e.g. 40% is projected as emission intensity improvement in the
reference case by IEA based on World Bank GDP-Purchasing
Power Parity projections (IEA 2009). For China, we quantified
the most encompassing of the stated pledges, i.e. the CO2
intensity improvement target, but not the partially overlapping
renewable energy and reforestation pledges. Only countries
with quantitative descriptions in their NAMAs are included in
this analysis. Emission reductions occurring in the land-use
sector are treated separately (cf below).
2.2.3. International shipping and aviation. Besides national
emissions, the emission contribution from international
bunkers is also calculated to obtain the global total. Emissions
from international shipping and aviation are not addressed by
the Accord. Therefore we apply the announcements by the
respective industry association (ICS 2009) and the specialized
agency of the United Nations (ICAO 2009), recognizing that at
this stage there is no clear indication of if or how these are to
be achieved in practice.
2.2.4. Global land-use emissions. Because of the
large uncertainties in the data for land use and land-use
change emissions provided in the National Communications
of developing countries, global pathways of deforestation
are based on those developed in the framework of the
representative concentration pathways (RCP) for the IPCC
Fifth Assessment Report process. As reference pathway, we
assume the global harmonized RCP8.5 pathway (Riahi et al
2007). From this global pathway the announced deforestation
reduction ranges from Brazil, Indonesia and other countries
are subtracted such that case 1 and case 2 global deforestation
pathways are created.
2.2.5. Emission extensions beyond 2020. The Accord
only specifies pledges for 2020. As the global climatic
assessment strongly depends on what happens after 2020, two
different extensions of the emission pathway beyond 2020
were developed. The ‘reference growth’ case allows emissions
to grow further according to the growth rates found in the
PRIMAP4 scenario if no 2050 targets from before the Accord
were available. The ‘global 2050 target’ variants halve the
global Kyoto-GHG basket of emissions by 2050 from 1990
levels, and emissions continue to decrease after 2050 with an
exponential decrease at a rate equal to the average reduction
rate in the last decade before 2050. The pathways resulting
from these two variants are depicted in figure 2(a).
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Figure 2. Overview of emission pathways and their climatic consequences. (a) Global emission pathways of the PRIMAP4 reference scenario
(yellow line), the case 1 (blue line) and case 2 (red line) interpretation of Copenhagen Accord pledges for 2020. The shaded area shows the
contribution of banked surplus emission allowances. The dashed lines show the emission pathways with a global 2050 target being halving
global emissions by 2050 from 1990 levels. Climatic consequences are shown for case 1 with reference growth (solid red line) and case 2 with
a long-term target (dashed blue line). (b) Probability ranges for atmospheric CO2 concentrations with thresholds due to ocean acidification
(McNeil and Matear 2008, Silverman et al 2009, Steinacher et al 2009, Veron et al 2009). (c) Atmospheric CO2eq concentrations.
(d) Probability ranges for global temperature increase above pre-industrial with 1.5 and 2 ◦C thresholds. Historical temperature data estimates
from Brohan et al (2006).
2.3. Climatic assessment
Global climatic consequences (temperature, CO2 and CO2eq
concentrations) are calculated with the PRIMAP climate
module. To calculate the climatic consequences of each
global scenario, emissions of GHGs, tropospheric ozone
precursors and aerosols are generated by building on the
multi-gas characteristics within a large set of IPCC scenarios
(Nakicenovic and Swart 2000), using the Equal Quantile
Walk method (Meinshausen et al 2006). Subsequently, these
emissions are run through the reduced complexity coupled
carbon cycle climate model MAGICC6.3 (Meinshausen
et al 2008) to obtain future concentrations and temperature
probability distributions. Each resulting emission pathway
is run with 600 different sets of climate model parameters
as in the ‘illustrative default’ case in (Meinshausen et al
2009) and with a distribution of the climate sensitivity closely
representing IPCC AR4 estimates (IPCC 2007b). Before being
used as input to the climate model, the global bottom-up
pathway is harmonized to historical emission levels in 2000
in accordance with the IPCC scenarios of the Special Report
on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (Nakicenovic and Swart 2000).
3. Results, discussion and conclusion
3.1. Resulting 2020 emission levels
Global aggregate emission levels for the case 1 and case 2
interpretation of the Accord are 53.2 and 47.4 GtCO2eq in
2020, respectively, as summarized with other results in table 1.
Furthermore, case 1 yields emissions in 2020 which are
virtually equal to the emissions of the PRIMAP4 scenario. This
illustrates that the net effect of current Accord pledges in case 1
would globally not stimulate any actions beyond those which
were already in place before COP15/CMP5, if countries would
pool or freely exchange their emission allowances. Figure 2(a)
shows the calculated pathways.
Aggregate emission allowances of developed countries in
2020 are 19.9 and 15.7 GtCO2eq, or 6.5% above and 15.7%
below 1990 levels in case 1 and 2, respectively. Other analyses,
for example by the European Commission (2010), yield deeper
aggregate reduction percentages for developed countries in
their most ambitious cases. The main reason for this is that—
for comparison with IPCC ranges—we consider the developed
5
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Table 1. Characteristics of four analysed pathways.
Case 1
Post-2020
reference growth
Case 2
Post-2020
reference growth
Case 2
Global 2050 target
Illustrative
‘2 ◦C
compliant’
2020 emissions (GtCO2eq)
Global 53.2 47.4 47.4 40.3
Annex I 19.9 15.7 15.7 13.1
Non-Annex I 29.0 28.2 28.2 24.4
Land-use CO2 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.2
Int. transport 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.6
2050 emissions (GtCO2eq)
Global 54.7 53.1 17 17
Annex I 6.4a 6.4a N/Ab N/Ab
Non-Annex I 45.3 44.2 N/Ab N/Ab
Land-use CO2 1.6 1.1 1.1 0.9
Int. transport 1.4 1.4 0.6 0.6
2100 emissions (GtCO2eq)
Global 43 42 1 3
Cumulative emissions from 2000 to 2050 (total emissions) (GtCO2eq)
Global 2776 2638 2080 1792
Average 2020–2050 reduction rate (emissions excl. LULUCF)
Global No reduction No reduction 3.0% 2.3%
2100 CO2 concentrations (ppm CO2)
Median estimate 650 636 448 431
Likely (80%) range 568–714 558–697 408–475 395–456
2100 CO2eq concentrations (ppm CO2eq)
Median estimate 748 730 484 465
Likely (80%) range 659–838 644–813 439–525 425–501
Maximal 21st century temperatures above pre-industrial
Median estimate (◦C) 3.3 3.2 2.0 1.8
Likely (80%) range (◦C) 2.5–4.2 2.4–4.1 1.5–2.6 1.4–2.4
Probability > 1.5 ◦C 100% 100% 93% 84%
Probability > 2 ◦C >99% >99% 49% 37%
Probability > 3 ◦C 64% 60% 3% 2%
a 2050 targets by Annex I Parties communicated prior to the Copenhagen Accord are taken into account
(see the supplementary data available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/5/034013/mmedia).
b Because for this pathway no assumptions are made about the share of emission reductions by either
Annex I or Non-Annex I Parties in 2050, only the global value is relevant for this exercise.
countries’ group to consist of all countries listed in Annex I of
the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 1992), i.e. including Turkey11.
Looking at the individual developed countries’ results
reveals weak ambition levels. The European Union’s target
is a reduction of 20 or 30% below 1990 levels. Smaller
annual reductions from now to 2020 would be required to
achieve the 20% target, than the average reductions from
1980 to 2010 (−0.51% and −0.65% p.a. relative to 2000
levels, respectively). The United States’ target is 17% below
2005, equivalent to only 3% below 1990 levels. Canada
aligned itself with the USA target which results in an effective
target of 3% above 1990 levels. Canada’s proposed 2020
emission allowances would be above its current KP target
(6% below 1990 levels), making Canada the only country
weakening its ambition level following the Accord. Targets
11 Turkey is listed in Annex I of the Convention, but did not take up
commitments under the KP and thus is not listed in Annex B of the Protocol.
Moreover, Turkey so far did not submit a pledge to the Copenhagen Accord
and thus its reference path is used. We choose to include Turkey in the Annex I
aggregate to assure consistency with IPCC ranges for Annex I.
for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus still imply emission levels
above projected PRIMAP4 levels, generating additional so-
called ‘hot air’. Pledges of two developed countries have
significantly higher ambitions: Japan and Norway with 25%,
and 30%–40% below 1990, respectively. Ultimately, even
the optimistic interpretation of the Accord’s pledges results
in effective reductions by 2020 far outside the 25–40% range
of aggregated emission reductions for developed countries
specified in Box 13.7 of IPCC AR4 (IPCC 2007a). That box
provided data for the lowest category of analysed mitigation
scenarios which stabilize atmospheric CO2eq concentrations
between 445 and 490 ppm CO2eq and have a best estimate
global temperature increase of 2.0–2.4 ◦C at equilibrium.
Our assessment of developing countries’ actions in 2020
results in aggregate emissions of 29.0 and 28.2 GtCO2eq, for
case 1 and 2, respectively. These emission levels are excluding
deforestation-related emissions, as they are treated separately
(cf below). The quantified reductions reflect deviations below
the PRIMAP4 reference scenario of 5 and 7% respectively.
6
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These percentages are not directly comparable with the IPCC
AR4, as only a ‘substantial deviation’ was specified in Box
13.7 of the AR4 (IPCC 2007a). A quantification of this
‘substantial deviation from baseline’ has been attempted by
den Elzen and Ho¨hne (2008, 2010) and resulted in a rough
range of 15–30% deviation below ‘the baseline’ in 2020. A
strict comparison with the latter range is not possible due to
the lack of absolute emission levels to compare with. As the
NAMAs analysed here represent about 68% of total projected
developing country emissions in 2020, they appear to be a good
proxy for estimating the overall aggregate level of ambition
for developing countries. Whilst there are uncertainties in
the projections of developing country emissions, by building
on data which is officially reported by Parties, this analysis
has tried to be closely aligned with actual Party intentions as
expressed under the Accord.
The international transport sector’s contribution to the
global 2020 emission level is 1.9 GtCO2eq in case 1, with
1.1 GtCO2eq from international shipping and 0.7 GtCO2eq
from international aviation. In case 2, lower shipping
emissions reduce the contribution of the international transport
sector to 1.8 GtCO2eq.
The influence of the Accord’s pledges on land-use-related
emissions in 2020 is assessed globally. Case 1 yields global
land-use emissions of 2.5 GtCO2eq. This results from our
reference level emissions in 2020 of 3.3 GtCO2eq lowered
by the less ambitious end of the REDD-related (reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) pledges.
In case 2, net emissions are 1.8 GtCO2eq. The latter level
might actually be too optimistic, as discussed below.
If nations would agree to a 50% reduction by 2050
from 1990 levels, then global industrial emissions will need
to decline on average 3.0–3.5% (compared to 2000 levels)
in each year between 2020 and 2050 for case 1 and 2
respectively. Such reductions would require unprecedented
political will to incentivize the necessary technological and
economic innovation and can be regarded as extreme based on
current scenario literature (den Elzen et al 2010b). It should
also be pointed out, that a 50% reduction from 1990 levels by
2050 is considerably more ambitious than the same reduction
relative to e.g. 2005 levels, as global emissions rose by 21%
between 1990 and 2005.
Uncertainties are an inherent part of global emission
assessments. For example, even inventories for historical
emissions (Boden et al 2009, IEA 2009, IPCC 2007a, JRC
and PBL 2009) have uncertainty ranges of ±10% for fossil and
industrial CO2 emissions and up to ±75% for CO2 emissions
from land-use. The latter uncertainty range is still without
taking into account recent re-estimates for peat-fire (van der
Werf et al 2010) and peat-degradation (Hooijer et al 2010)
emissions. The uncertainty range for the results of this
analysis is at least as large as the uncertainties in historical
emissions, and is further increased by the uncertainties in the
quantification of future action and compliance.
3.2. Climatic impacts
Case 1 with reference growth after 2020 results in a
likely global temperature increase of 2.5–4.2 ◦C above pre-
industrial in 2100 and is still increasing afterwards. For
the ‘likely’ range we assume an 80% range around the
median, corresponding to the IPCC’s ‘likely’ definition of
66%–90% (IPCC 2005). Using the same IPCC uncertainty
definitions, 2 ◦C is exceeded with virtual certainty (>99%
chance) as illustrated in figure 2(d). Therefore this scenario
is not in line with the Accord’s aim to limit the global
temperature increase to 2 ◦C. Case 2 with reference growth
yields very similar results because of the high cumulative
emissions between 2000 and 2050 implied by the emission
trajectory (Meinshausen et al 2009). A scenario with case 2
emission levels in 2020 and a global 2050 target of 50% below
1990 levels results in a likely range of 1.5–2.6 ◦C of maximal
21st century global temperature increase and a 49% chance to
stay below 2 ◦C. Probability plots of the climatic results for
case 1 with reference growth and case 2 with a global 2050
target are shown in figures 2(b)–(d).
Rising global average temperature levels are not the
only possible ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system’. For example, increasing atmospheric CO2
levels cause increasing ocean acidification and will adversely
impact marine ecosystems (Doney et al 2009, Hoegh-Guldberg
and Bruno 2010). A recent study (Veron et al 2009) defines
an atmospheric CO2 concentration of below 350 ppm CO2 as
a long-term safe limit needed for coral reefs, while a CO2
concentration of 450 ppm CO2 would cause reefs to be in
rapid and terminal decline. Silverman et al (2009) indicate
furthermore that coral reefs cease to grow and start dissolving
at 560 ppm CO2. Both in Arctic (Steinacher et al 2009)
and Antarctic (McNeil and Matear 2008) oceans, aragonite
undersaturation—causing calcium carbonate shells beginning
to dissolve—is projected to occur at atmospheric concentration
levels of 450 ppm CO2. For case 1 and without a 2050 target,
median estimates would exceed the 450 ppm CO2 threshold
in approximately 2030. The 560 ppm CO2 threshold is very
likely exceeded by the end of this century. Even for case 2
(with a global 2050 target and exponential decline afterwards),
estimated likely CO2 levels (408–475 ppm CO2) would imply a
rapid decline of coral reefs and arctic aragonite undersaturation
during the 21st century. Continuous mitigation effort through
the entire century and beyond will be necessary to return
atmospheric CO2 concentrations to a level considered safe for
marine ecosystems.
When looking at the range of analyses of the Accord
(cf above), estimated 2020 emission levels are in broad
agreement. However, in some cases, emissions of 48 GtCO2eq
or higher in 2020 are interpreted as congruent with being
‘2 ◦C compliant’ (Bowen and Ranger 2009, Stern 2009, UNEP
2010). Such pathways often rely on ambitious global emission
reduction rates e.g. 5% yearly from 2021 to 2030. Although
not impossible nor strictly infeasible, global annual reduction
rates of 5% in the decade after 2020 would require far reaching
policy interventions in the coming years to motivate key
investments.
Thus, we investigate a fourth illustrative scenario (see
table 1), which we label ‘2 ◦C compliant’. Following the
assessment of Box 13.7 of the AR4 (IPCC 2007a), we apply
an aggregate developed country reduction of 30% below 1990
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levels and a ‘substantial deviation from baseline’ of 20% for
developing countries to the PRIMAP4 scenario. Global land-
use CO2 emissions are taken from RCP4.5 (Clarke et al 2007,
Smith and Wigley 2006, Wise et al 2009). This results in
global emission levels of 40–44 GtCO2eq in 2020, depending
on the baseline (the global PRIMAP4 reference scenario is
rather low). These 2020 emission levels would limit the
decline of global industrial emissions on average to below
2.3% (compared to 2000 levels) in each year between 2020 and
2050—if keeping the goal of halving global emissions from
1990 to 2050. In order to reach this 2050 milestone, starting
from 2020 emission levels of 44 GtCO2eq or higher would
imply reduction rates that are sometimes considered extreme
based on the current scenario literature (den Elzen et al 2010b).
As the Accord has no legally binding character, parties can
add, modify or withdraw their submitted pledges or actions
without any restriction. Since mid-April—the moment the
snapshot of mitigation actions for this study was taken—
several parties have done so. As a positive example, additional
actions were submitted by Papua New Guinea, Moldova,
Mauritania and others. Most of these actions are unfortunately
not quantifiable because of a lack of quantitative details in
the submissions. A clear assessment with respect to the
global PRIMAP4 pathway is therefore not possible. For
Indonesia, an increased reduction in deforestation was assumed
for case 2. As this reduction, which is conditional on
international support, was not part of their submission, the
current deforestation pathway might show an overly optimistic
picture for the Accord’s outcome. For our analysis, these
changes in the pledges will slightly change the aggregate
emission numbers, but not the key results of our analysis.
3.3. Conclusion
If the average national ambition level for 2020 is not
substantially improved and loopholes closed in the continued
negotiations, only low probability options remain for reaching
the 2 ◦C (and possible 1.5 ◦C) ambition of the Accord. Most
developed country submissions to the Accord indicate that
only with a global and comprehensive agreement countries
are inclined to commit to more, and likewise for developing
countries the required level of support through financing,
technology and capacity building is needed. With the
negotiation mandates having been extended to the end of 2010,
committing to higher ambitions and agreement by all Parties
still remains possible. It is clear from this analysis that higher
ambitions for 2020 are necessary to keep the options for 2 and
1.5 ◦C open without relying on potentially infeasible reduction
rates after 2020. In addition, the absence of a mid-century
emission goal—towards which Parties as a whole can work and
which can serve as a yardstick of whether interim reductions by
2020 and 2030 are on the right track—is a critical deficit in the
overall ambition level of the Copenhagen Accord.
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